

# The Bureaucratic Model of Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of United Nations Decision on American Invasion of Iraq

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## ABSTRACT

The paper is an examination of the invasion of Iraq from the resolution of the United Nations which was first spearheaded by the United States. It analyses the intrigues of super powers in international politics. From the historical-descriptive research adopted, findings show that Iraq was unjustly invaded as it allowed for IAEA inspectors to get into Iraq but denied them second entry as no weapons of mass destruction uncovered in the state. The paper concludes that many actions or inactions have been taken without the collective consent of the other members of the Security Council, especially by the United States. The paper recommends sanctioning any state that violates the decisions of the organization for the world to be a better place to live in the next centuries to come.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Model, Foreign Policy, Analysis and Invasion.

## INTRODUCTION

It has widely been perceived that organizations that are designed and operated as if they were machines are commonly referred to as bureaucracies. Keep in mind however that most organizations are bureaucratized in some degree, for the mechanistic mode of thought has shaped our most basic conceptions of what organization is all about. When business managers or public administrators think of organizations as machines, they tend to manage and design them as machines made up of interlocking parts that each plays a clearly defined role in the functioning of the whole. While in certain circumstances a mechanical mode of organization can provide the basis for highly effective operation, but in others it can have many unfortunate consequences. One of the most fundamental problems of organizational study is that the mechanical way of thinking is so ingrained in our everyday conceptions of organization that it is often very difficult to organize in any other way. To become more open to other ways of thinking, it is therefore useful, in this work, to have a critical discussion on the application of bureaucratic model on foreign policy analysis as it deals with the workings of the United Nations with emphasis on her decision as it has to do with members state with a close look at the decision of the United States to invade Iraq against the popular decision of the body (UN). Though, the UN declared Iraq's actions for the invasion of Kuwait invalid in another scenario; and economic sanctions were put in place as captured in the UN Resolution 678 which was also not with the full support of the UN. This is why in the works of Durbin (2015), bureaucratic model sees foreign policy formulation as a game of bargaining where independent actors most importantly agents of governmental institutions with independent organizational powers come to argue and bargain for their own interest which in turn will serve as a foreign policy decision without looking at the collective or the national interest.

Bureaucracy is mechanically applied in the dealing of the United Nations and the case of American invasion of Iraq goes to show the limits and shortcoming of the bureaucracy found in the United Nations (UN). The decision of America to invade Iraq after the failure of international diplomatic efforts and sanctions, a 28-member military coalition under US command launched the Gulf War (Sheriff and Umar, 2014: 126), even when this was not sanctioned or approved by either the general house or all members of the Security Council goes to show that there

is a problem in the chain of power and authority as it is spelt out in the United Nations Charter (1945). Consequently, we shall be looking at the operations of Bureaucracy in foreign policy analysis as we will be applying it to the working of the United Nations (UN). The theory of Bureaucracy was applied to test the empiricism of the study and we concluded that the invasion of Iraq by the United States against the rulings of the bureaucratic setting in the United Nations (UN) goes to show that United States is demonstrating her Super-Power position in the international system where she does whatever she likes not minding whose ox is gored. According to Jerry M. Long, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and subsequent response that followed from the United States was a fulfilment of the dreams of President Bush who believe in a major objective: 'In, out, do it right, get done' (cited in Sheriff and Umar, 2015: 125).

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Generally speaking, bureaucracy is however perceived as a form of organization that emphasizes precision, speed, clarity, regularity, reliability, and efficiency achieved through the creation of a fixed division of tasks, hierarchical supervision and detailed rules and regulations. But is this really what Max Weber had in mind when he wrote his classical work on "*The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*" in 1947? Perhaps, the answer to the above-mentioned question is not so simple and straightforward (Johanasen and Swigart, 1996:56). The original definition of Weber's bureaucracy is rather complicated and complex as we need to carefully look at its basic characteristics that would illustrate Weber's ideal type of rational and efficient organization. According to Max Weber, there seems to be a need to establish a rational basis for the organization and management of large-scale undertakings, whether public or private.

In the same vein, Graham T. Allison's 1969 article in *The American Political Science Review*, was of the view that policy outcomes result from a game of bargaining among a small, highly placed group of governmental actors. These actors come to the game with varying preferences, abilities, and positions of power. Participants choose strategies and policy goals based on different ideas of what outcomes will best serve their organizational and personal interests. Bargaining then proceeds through a pluralist process of give-and-take that reflects the prevailing rules of the game as well as power relations among the participants. Because this process is neither dominated by one individual nor likely to privilege expert or rational decisions, it may result in suboptimal outcomes that fail to fulfil the objectives of any of the individual participants. Although Allison built on the earlier works and writings of Charles Lindblom and Richard Neustadt etc. One of the most critical problems was how any large organization might function more systematically and efficiently. Weber perceived that bureaucracy which meant management by the office or position rather than by a person or patrimonial was the answer. To him, bureaucracy was an ideal organization, not the most desirable, but in fact the pure form of organization. Weber sought to define bureaucracy as one that would be perfectly rational and would provide maximum efficiency of operation (Weber, 1990:15).

It is important to note here that his model was a hypothetical rather than a factual description of how most organizations were structured. Therefore, it is also true that combinations of various organizational arrangements

would appear in practice, however, what Weber attempted to describe was one type of ideal organization for the purpose of theoretical analysis. In essence, the bureaucratic construct would serve as a normative model to ease the transition from small-scale entrepreneurial to large-scale professional management in organizations. Based on Weber's idea, there are three pure types of legitimate authority; legal-rational authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. Weber argued that traditional and charismatic authority was irrational and less efficient when compared to legal-rational authority (Pugh, Hickson and Hinings, 1985:19).

The decision of the United States to invade Iraq against a decision taken by a supra-international organization as the United Nations (UN) even when the bureaucratic structures and powers in the UN felt it was not ideal to do so goes to show that organizations are either the shadow of one man or a certain decision making structure inside the main structure in the organization. This is why Karl Marx sees bureaucracy within the general framework of the theory of conflict as he posited that is an instrument by which the dominant class exercises its domination over the other social classes (Ogunna, 1999:407).

It also goes to show that the United States relied on the bureaucratic advice of her security department and intelligence to resolve on the decision to invade Iraq not minding what the outcome of the UN bureaucratic structure was going to be. Nevertheless, Weber's bureaucracy is not without its drawbacks. In fact, bureaucratic approaches to organization often have severe limitations. One piece of work that gives rise to the arguments against Weber's theory of Bureaucracy is that by Johansen and Swigart. They believed that the old, stable pyramid shape, with a broad base of line workers, a medium range of middle managers, and a few top executives, had disappeared. For them, what replaces the monolithic organization is what they call "the fishnet organization". Basically, the fishnet is a metaphor they chose to express the form of organization emerging from the current turmoil. They envisaged that hierarchy is giving way to more horizontal structures with complex yet flexible webs of interconnection (Johansen and Swigart, 1996:15-16).

Similar to what Johansen and Swigart had in mind when they proposed the fishnet organization, John Kotter argued for flatter structured organization in which he called "the organization of the future". He saw that the typical twentieth-century organization has not operated successfully in a rapidly changing environment since the rate of change in the business world is getting faster and faster. Structure, systems, practices and culture need to be carefully looked at and managed so that organization can succeed with incremental change.

The structures Kotter envisaged and pictured is pretty much similar to an organizational framework that has been proposed by Gifford and Elizabeth Pinchot. They viewed effective organizations as organizations that will rely on systems that develop and express the intelligence, judgment, collaborative abilities, and wide-system responsibility of all their members. In the same vein, Parson (1960) criticizes the internal consistency of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. He argued that Weber's model has elements for internal conflicts more especially conflicts between professionals and the bureaucratic authority.

## **THE AMERICAN INVASION OF IRAQ AGAINST UNITED NATIONS DECISION**

After the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attack on the twin tower in America, she was disposed to attack any country considered to be a breeding group for terrorists. When Iraq under Saddam Hussein was accused to be producing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the United Nations decided to send her inspection team into Iraq to ascertain the veracity of this accusation. When the team got to Iraq, no weapon of mass destruction was seen or its factory discovered. The team of inspectors reported their finding to the United Nations Security Council, but the United States backed by Britain insisted that Iraq was producing Weapons of Mass Destruction and must be stopped. Saddam Hussein was also accused of haven dug a pit where thousands of innocent children were buried. The decision to send another set of inspectors into Iraq angered Saddam who refused them entry or inspecting any part of Iraq. This action prompted the United States to warn Saddam to either give way to the UN team of inspectors or step down as the president of Iraq or face the wrath of the US might. With the exception of Britain, other countries in the United Nations Security Council were not disposed with the plan to invade Iraq as the allegations levied against Saddam were yet to be substantiated.

The sustained decision to attack or invade Iraq has placed a crack on the bureaucracy of the United Nations as the decision overruled other members of the Security Council and seems to have been motivated much more by a national or personal interest rather than in the interest of the international system for the maintenance of world peace and order. There were believes in some quarters that the bureaucratic channel in the US already had a plan to invade Iraq even before the accusations – which were yet to be substantiated – were brought against Iraq. Before beginning the war, in 2002, Condoleezza Rice's staff prepared the rationale for war in a paper entitled, 'Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime'. This paper provided a range of main reasons for the invasion of Iraq following the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment that Saddam Hussein had WMD: firstly, Iraq's WMD capability; secondly, its support for terrorism; thirdly, threats to its neighbours, and finally, its tyrannical nature (Feith, 2008:304). In a similar fashion, President George W. Bush announced that America's purpose in declaring war on Iraq was clear, and was characterized by three main reasons, including destroying their "weapons of mass destruction", to end Saddam's support of terrorism and the freedom of the Iraqi people (Cramer and Thrall, 2011:1). These were the pronounced reasons by US under George W. Bush to endorse the invasion of Iraq by his country. Some scholars have also argued that there are unpronounced reasons which were the main reason for the invasion of Iraq.

Many scholars holds the view that, a key driver of the war and the core reason behind the invasion of Iraq was U.S. desire to control Iraq's oil reserves in order to secure future energy supplies (Hinnebusch, 2007:212). Gaining control of Iraq's oil was necessary so that the United States could become less dependent than European and East Asian countries on Persian Gulf oil (Zunes, 2006:29), and there is no doubt that the U.S. hegemony depends on oil and energy resources. As Simon Bromely illustrates, since the Second World War, the key pillar of U.S. hegemony has been dominated by U.S. companies and their control of the world's oil resources concentrated in the Middle East. Oil has also been essential in the provision of military power (Hinnebusch, 2007:212). In addition, Smith

(2005:33) has argued that the Iraq war can be seen as part of a significant effort to control regional oil supplies in the Middle East.

Moreover, in his work entitled “Blood Oil” Klare (2004:41) concluded that, for Bush, the top foreign policy priority was not terrorism or the need to control the spread WMDs, but rather to increase the energy sources from external suppliers to markets in the United States. Recent cases reported by Phillips (2004:330) also support the hypothesis that, since the 1990s, oil supplies have become integral to U.S. concerns in the Middle East. In this way, the United States tried to find reliable energy resources in order to lessen its dependence upon Saudi Arabia, which can be unreliable and lacks stability in the long run (Cramer and Thrall 2011:11). By contrast, some analysts have opposed the oil hypothesis and explanation as a central reason for the invasion of Iraq. For example, Cramer and Duggan (2011:228) argue that the cost of an invasion would be greater than the economic benefits of any such action.

It was clear that the evidence presented thus supports the idea that the oil interest was widespread and played a major role in the assessment of an explanation for the removal of the Iraqi regime. The control of Iraqi oil provided considerable future geopolitical leverage for the United States (Smith 2005:184). Therefore, Kathryn Talentino (2004:323) argues that, “for many, oil rather than principle seemed most relevant in the U.S. approach to Iraq”. Although, oil justification has been absent among members of the Bush administration (Duffield 2005:109), one key driver of the Iraq war was controlling oil interests and energy sources, but oil was not only the relevant reason for the invasion of Iraq.

In order to understand why the Bush administration led the attack on Iraq, it is necessary to shift the focus from security threats against the United States to its strategic position in the Middle East. The Bush doctrine began with the assumption that the United States was at the time the only superpower in the world and one which attempted to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future. As Robert Jervis argues, empire was the main element of the Bush administration (cited in Schmidt and Williams 2008:195). Hence, redesigning the Middle East was likely to be important to the success of this strategy (Hinnebusch, 2007:220). Philosopher and scholar Slavoj (2004:43) supports this argument, arguing that the real underlying reasons for the attack on Iraq was the urge to brutally assert and signal unconditional U.S. hegemony, since the U.S. administration viewed Iraq as a ripe target in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 2006:107).

The National Security Strategy of the Bush administration reflected this agenda which called for translating America’s “position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” (Bush, 2002). It argued that the war on Iraq could be comprehended as part of U.S. hegemony. Hinnebusch (2007:219) therefore claims that the hegemony policy offers to provide a global currency for world trade ensures the flow of cheap energy supplies to the global economy and spreads liberal economic rules universally. The United States needs to be the most potent military power in order to play this role in this region. Recalled that it was mentioned earlier that the interest to invade Iraq seems to be shrouded under some mystery which only George Bush and his bureaucratic

class hold to their chest to pursue their foreign policy drive which is clouded around their interest for oil to sustain their economic dominance in the world and to display to the globe their military might and super power position in comity of nations. This goes to show that George Bush and his bureaucratic machinery in the United States took the decision to invade Iraq not intending to pass through any due process under the rules of the United Nations which she indirectly controls most of its machineries.

## **CONCLUSION**

The decision to invade Iraq by the United States of America goes to show that after the end of the second world war and the eventual rise of the United States to the throne of hegemony, many of her actions and inactions were taken even against the collective decisions or stand of the United Nations which was supposed to have the bureaucratic mechanism and machinery to regulate the activities of her member states. The action of the United States only goes to show that there are ulterior motives behind the invasion which she has continued to deny up till date but which her action to invade against the rulings of the United Nations tends to demonstrate otherwise.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Sequel to the invasion of Iraq by the United States, even against the directive of the United Nations, we have decided to make the following recommendation to serve as a deterrent and strengthening factor to the United Nations if she must continue to remain relevant in the international system, and the recommendations are thus:

Any member state that goes against the decision of the organization has to be sanctioned, no matter how big or small the country might be.

The membership of the permanent members in the Security Council needs to be expanded to accommodate more members for the equity and equality which is one of what the organization wants to protect and provide in the international system and she cannot afford to be preaching one thing and be seen to be doing another thing.

The United States must be made to pay reparation for invading Iraq wrongly as up till date she is yet to show the world the said weapon of mass destruction being produced by Iraq and her troops must be made to leave the Iraqi soil with immediate effect, except where the government in power demands their presence.

All forms of nuclear programmes – be it the big or small countries – must not be allowed to continue to avert a Third World War as smaller countries are being threatened and scared having the knowledge that the big countries or powers has weapons that is capable of whipping their whole countries within a matter of minutes.

The charter of the United Nations needs a total overhaul to enable the organization attend to the pressing needs of her members and carry out it functions effectively in view of the present realities.



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